




Re: West Lake Landfill - Carnahan letter   
Dan Gravatt to: Muenks, Shawn

03/30/2012 08:50 AM

Here is EPA's response to the October 2010 letter from Rep. Carnahan:



Carnahan response letter Oct10.pdf

Sincerely,  
Daniel R. Gravatt, PG  
US EPA Region 7 SUPR / MOKS  
901 North 5th Street, Kansas City, KS 66101  
Phone (913) 551-7324 Fax (913) 551-7063

Principles and integrity are expensive, but they are among the very few things worth having.

"Muenks, Shawn"

Dan, I am doing some file cleanup for West Lake...

03/28/2012 11:48:21 AM

From: "Muenks, Shawn" <shawn.muenks@dnr.mo.gov>  
To: Dan Gravatt/R7/USEPA/US@EPA  
Date: 03/28/2012 11:48 AM  
Subject: West Lake Landfill - Carnahan letter

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Dan,

I am doing some file cleanup for West Lake Landfill and came across a letter from Russ Carnahan to Lisa Jackson dated October 8, 2010 (see attached). Do you know if EPA responded to this letter? If so, do you have a copy of EPA's response?

Thanks.

Shawn Muenks, P.E.  
Missouri Department of Natural Resources  
P.O. Box 176, Jefferson City, MO 65102-0176  
Ph: (573)751-3107  
email: [shawn.muenks@dnr.mo.gov](mailto:shawn.muenks@dnr.mo.gov)[attachment "20101008 WLL Carnahan to EPA.pdf" deleted by Dan Gravatt/R7/USEPA/US]

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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION VII  
901 NORTH 5TH STREET  
KANSAS CITY, KANSAS 66101

NOV 08 2010

OFFICE OF  
THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR

The Honorable Russ Carnahan  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Attention: Ken Reidy

Dear Congressman Carnahan:

Thank you for your letter of October 8, 2010, to EPA regarding the West Lake Landfill Superfund site, in which you posed four questions about the Record of Decision for Operable Unit 1 (OUI). EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson asked that I respond to your concerns. I will answer the questions below in the order in which you posed them.

**Question 1:** The selected remedy calls for the installation of an engineered landfill cover and implementation of a long-term monitoring program. In light of the location being in the Missouri River floodplain, what effect would a levee failure have on this location?

I would like to assure you that EPA has reviewed existing information on floods and levee performance. Enclosed are: (1) a detailed technical memorandum that summarizes EPA's findings and conclusions; (2) a presentation that my staff prepared; and (3) a map showing the West Lake Landfill/Earth City Industrial Park Levee System.

EPA analyzed the information in response to your question regarding the flood event of 1993 and the breach of the Chesterfield-Monarch Levee upstream. The Chesterfield-Monarch Levee was considered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to be a 100-year levee. Early speculation was that the failure of Chesterfield-Monarch type levees relieved the pressures on the urban levees that did not fail. To determine the real effects existing levees had on peak levels for the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) utilized its UNET model. Results of the modeling demonstrated that if all levees protecting agricultural land such as the Chesterfield-Monarch, 100-year levee were absent, the peak flood stage in the St. Louis area would have been reduced by 2.5 feet, but still 17 feet above flood stage and almost 4 feet higher than the previous maximum recorded from the 1973 flood event. Neither of these flood events overtopped or caused either the Earth City or Riverport Levees to fail.

Another conclusion from the modeling indicated that even if the levees in place were constructed to contain all flows, peak stages at St. Louis would have been increased by 2.3 feet, which is still above flood stage, but well below the designated 500-year design level of the Earth

City and Riverport Levees. The independent model commissioned by the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* concluded that the overtopping and eventual breaching of two levees downstream from St. Louis at Columbia and Harrisonville, Illinois, reduced peak stage at St. Louis by 1.6 feet and lends support to the UNET findings.

You also expressed concerns regarding the potential failure of the Earth City Levee and the impacts of any contamination that might escape the West Lake landfill as a result. In response to your concerns, we conducted a thorough review and analysis of the levee system surrounding Earth City and the West Lake Landfill site location.

In summary, the levee system surrounding the West Lake area is highly engineered to exceed the 500-year flood level and not like the Chesterfield-Monarch Levees that failed during the flood of 1993. The 500-year flood level would be 3-7 feet below the top of the levee. The West Lake landfill is almost 1.5 miles behind the levee, and the surface grade at the landfill is at least 25 feet above the historic floodplain. Also, the closest drinking water intake is approximately 8 miles from the site. If flood waters were to reach the landfill, and if the toe were unprotected (e.g., no bank stabilization in place and no bank armoring in place) then what would predictably be low-energy flood waters could begin to erode the bank and entrain landfill material into already contaminated and undrinkable flood water. However, the design of the cap at the West Lake landfill will include armoring of the toe and consideration will be given during cap design of other measures to prevent possible erosion of the slope. In short, the protectiveness of the selected remedy for OUI does not depend on the Earth City levee system.

EPA has thoroughly analyzed any potential flooding concerns as part of the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study process. That information, as well as other technical documents, has been placed in the administrative records for the site located at The Bridgeton Trails Branch of the St. Louis County Library, 3455 McKelvey Road, Bridgeton, Missouri, and EPA's Regional Office in Kansas City, Kansas.

**Question 2:** The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has cleaned up a number of radiologically contaminated locations in the area. What reasons does EPA have for not transferring control of this site from EPA to the Corps in order to remediate the contaminated waste?

In 1974, Congress assigned the Corps authority to manage sites that were part of the nation's early atomic energy and weapons program.<sup>1</sup> The West Lake landfill was not part of that program, but rather, is a landfill where radioactive wastes were disposed of. West Lake landfill is addressed by EPA under its Superfund authority as the landfill contains radioactive wastes, which are hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The Corps does not have authority to address the contamination at the landfill and EPA does not have the authority to transfer control of the West Lake landfill to the Corps. Please note that the differences in the remedies selected for each site are due to site-specific circumstances; the differences are not attributable to the fact that these

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<sup>1</sup> These sites became known as FUSRAP sites, indicating they are part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program.

nearby radiologically contaminated locations (known as the North St. Louis County FUSRAP sites) are managed by the Corps while the West Lake landfill is managed by EPA.

In the case of the North St. Louis County sites, the contaminated media is generally surface soils. The contaminated soil is or was widely distributed across approximately 80 properties including the St. Louis Airport Sites, owned by the city of St. Louis, and a variety of properties used for a variety of purposes, e.g., commercial, light industrial, recreational, open fields, and transportation facilities. These considerations were factored into the remedy which calls for the accessible contaminated soils to be excavated and shipped for commercial disposal.

A subset of the St. Louis FUSRAP contaminated soils, referred to as the inaccessible soils, are located under roads, active rail lines, buildings, and other permanent structures. There are over 69,000 cubic yards of contaminated soils in this category. The inaccessible soils do not pose an exposure concern as long as the road or other permanent structure remains in place. The Selected Remedy for these inaccessible soils at the North St. Louis County FUSRAP sites is to manage these in place using institutional controls.

In contrast to the situation in North St. Louis County, the West Lake landfill has been a landfill since the early 1950s and will remain a dedicated landfill site in the future. The landfill is secured by fencing and is not accessible to the public. The radiological contamination is disposed of with other wastes in the landfill. The current use and the reasonably anticipated future use of the Site is as a landfill. In short, waste disposal is consistent with current and future land use at the West Lake Landfill Superfund site; such is not the case for the North St. Louis County sites. Accordingly, land use at the West Lake Landfill Superfund site is restricted through covenants recorded by the property owners; the restrictions cannot be terminated without the written approval of both the Missouri Department of Natural Resources and EPA. In addition, more comprehensive land-use restrictions are required as part of the Selected Remedy for OU1. If there is an analogy to be drawn with the North St. Louis County FUSRAP sites, it is with the inaccessible soils that, like the wastes in the landfill, do not pose a health concern as long as the barrier to exposure remains in place.

**Question 3:** Does EPA consider this location [to] be permanent or temporary storage for this radioactive waste?

The Selected Remedy for OU1 is intended to be a permanent solution. EPA is required by statute to conduct periodic reviews (called five-year reviews) for the purpose of certifying that the remedy continues to be protective of human health and the environment. Any changes to requirements or health standards will be factored into these reviews. Based on significant new information, EPA can require new work and/or make changes to the remedy as necessary to protect human health and the environment.

**Question 4:** Even if there is a cap to stop water from entering the fill, what is there to stop radioactive particulate from seeping into the groundwater, given that there is no protective layering below the fill?

Capping through the use of engineered covers is a mature and routinely applied technology that forms a barrier between the contaminated media and the surface, thereby shielding humans and the environment from the contaminants and from the effects of radiation. Capping is the approach used at uranium mill tailing sites, for example. The cap is designed to be sufficiently thick and impermeable as to isolate the waste and restrict surface water infiltration into the subsurface. When the waste is above the water table, as in the case of the radiologically contaminated material at the site, a properly designed cap can prevent the percolation of water from the surface to the underlying contaminated materials. Under the Selected Remedy for OU1, the cap will be extended beyond the perimeter of the contaminated area and include side slopes to prevent any lateral infiltration. It is important to understand that it is the cover, not a liner, which prevents surface water from contacting the material and then migrating to the groundwater.

Significant migration of radionuclides to groundwater or perched water within the landfill waste material has not occurred, even though the radionuclides were placed there in 1973 and an engineered cover has not yet been placed on the landfill. As presented in the Remedial Investigation report, the results of extensive groundwater monitoring indicate some isolated impacts to the shallow groundwater from the landfill activities. Radionuclides, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, pesticides, and trace metals have all been detected. Most of these, including radionuclides, occur sporadically and at trace levels. Most of the results for radionuclides and trace metals are consistent with background, although several detections of radium and arsenic have exceeded drinking water standards. These detections are not contiguous and do not indicate the presence of a groundwater contaminant plume. The Selected Remedy for OU1 includes ongoing groundwater monitoring to confirm that the engineered cap is preventing migration of radionuclides and other contaminants to groundwater.

Again, thank you for your letter. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me at 913-551-7006 or your staff may call Rich Hood, Associate Regional Administrator for Media and Intergovernmental Relations, at 913-551-7906.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Karl Brooks', with a stylized, flowing script.

Karl Brooks  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION 7  
901 NORTH 5TH STREET  
KANSAS CITY, KANSAS 66101

NOV 03 2010

**MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT:** Congressional Inquiry from Congressman Russ Carnahan  
West Lake Landfill Remedy

**FROM:** Cecilia Tapia, Director  
Superfund Division

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Cecilia Tapia", written over the "FROM:" line.

**TO:** Karl Brooks  
Regional Administrator

At your request, we have reviewed the concerns outlined in the referenced letter and provide the following technical evaluation:

**The Flood of 1993 Analysis**

The Flood of 1993 in the Midwestern United States was a hydrometeorological event without precedent in modern times. In terms of precipitation amounts, record river levels, flood duration, area of flooding and economic losses, it surpassed all previous floods in the United States. However, conditions that preceded the flood were a series of meteorological events that began in the summer of 1992.

July, September, and November 1992, were much wetter than normal in the Upper Mississippi River Basin. Winter precipitation was normal, but a wet spring followed. The period from April to June was the wettest observed in the upper basin in the last 99 years. As a result, soils were saturated, and many streams were already flowing above normal levels when summer rains began.

A persistent atmospheric pattern during the summer of 1993 caused excessive rainfall across much of the Upper Mississippi River Basin. Major flooding resulted primarily from a series of heavy rainfall events over the Upper Mississippi Basin from May to August 1993, which were unmatched in the historical records of the Central United States. During the June-August 1993 period, rainfall totals surpassed 12 inches across the eastern Dakotas, southern Minnesota, eastern Nebraska, and most of Wisconsin, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana. Over 24 inches of rain fell on central and northeastern Kansas, northern and central Missouri, most of Iowa, southern Minnesota, and southwestern Nebraska. Up to 38.4 inches of rain fell in east-central Iowa.

Wet antecedent soils, swollen river conditions, and record rainfall resulted in the 1993 flood levels that ranged from below the 100-year up to the 500-year recurrence interval magnitude at many locations. For example, the 1993 flood stage at Louisiana, Missouri (about 100 miles above St. Louis, Missouri), is estimated to have a recurrence interval of nearly 500 years. At St. Louis, Missouri, the recurrence interval was about 175 years and at Chester, Illinois (about 70 miles below St. Louis, Missouri), the recurrence interval was about 100 years. At 45 U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) gauging stations, the flow levels exceeded the 100-year mark. However, the USGS has determined that the river reached record levels of river stage at St. Louis and elsewhere, although peak discharges were less than previously recorded.

### **Flood of 1993 Impacts**

The Midwest Flood of 1993, one of the most costly flood events in U.S. history, flooded over 6.6 million acres in the 419 counties in the upper Mississippi Basin. Flood waters impacted numerous sectors (e.g., agriculture, residences and businesses, and transportation systems). One of the sectors that was immediately affected by flood waters and directly impacting the general population were public facilities.

The Flood of 1993 caused extensive damage to water and wastewater treatment plants and other public facilities. Water treatment plants are often located in floodplains to be near well fields or the surface water that supplies the system. In addition, water supply lines must cross floodplains to serve floodplain residents. EPA identified 200 municipal water systems impacted to some degree by the flood. The most prominent example is the Des Moines Water Works that serves the city of Des Moines, Iowa and adjoining communities. The plant was flooded and remained out of operation for 12 days, and water from it was not safe to drink for another seven days.

Wastewater treatment plants tend to be located in floodplains which are generally the lowest point in a community and offer the advantage of gravity flow. Furthermore, the effluent from these plants is discharged into major rivers or streams. The impact of flooding ranges from a plant being temporary shutdown and raw sewage being discharged into rivers to physical damage to a plant resulting in extended shutdown and continued discharge of raw sewage until repairs are made.

A total of 388 wastewater facilities were impacted by the flood. Damages to utilities, including water and wastewater treatment facilities and storm-sewer systems, exceeded \$85 million.

Under nonquantifiable damage costs, EPA determined that 59 Superfund sites experienced flooding; however, impacts to the sites were minimal and required corrective measures were completed. In addition, 73 solid-waste treatment, storage, and disposal sites were also flooded; large propane tanks were dislodged and floated downriver creating the potential for massive explosions. Besides large propane tanks, the state collected over 18,000 orphaned drums – each contained potential hazardous or toxic substance – and a large amount of household hazardous wastes for which disposal was necessary.

In response to concerns regarding the safety of private wells, a water well survey was established in coordination with the nine flood states. EPA performed flood water quality sampling around

major metropolitan areas on the Missouri River. In some cases, drinking water standards were exceeded, but the majority of the readings posed no health risk. Results from sampling of treated drinking water revealed three locations where the Maximum Contaminant Level was exceeded although results from a single sample did not necessarily indicate a problem. The U.S. Geological Survey and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have not found significant changes in water chemistry since the 1993 flood.

## **Flood Control**

During the past 150 years or so, the Mississippi River Basin has undergone extensive development by mankind. Over the years, structural flood protection, both public and private, has been built to protect adjoining population and associated economic development.

The flood control system for the Upper Mississippi is made up of three components: flood control reservoirs, agricultural levees, and urban levees/floodwalls.

There are about 60 federal flood-control reservoirs above St. Louis. During the 1993 flood, the federal flood control reservoir system stored over 17 million acre feet of flood water. None of this water reached St. Louis until after the crest in August 1993. These reservoirs are credited with reducing flood levels at St. Louis by about three feet.

There are about 1,600 levees above St. Louis. About 95 percent of these levees are agricultural levees (much like the Chesterfield Levee) providing relatively low levels of flood protection to millions of acres of cropland against floods of 10 to 50 years frequency. The remaining 5 percent are urban levees/floodwalls (mostly federal) built to a very high level to protect cities and towns against floods of this magnitude.

During the 1993 flood, all levees and flood walls built to urban design standards withstood the onslaught. No urban levee or floodwall was overtopped and the densely populated areas they protected were not flooded. Examples of these levees are the Earth City Levee District and the Riverport Levee District.

## **The Earth City Levee District**

The Earth City Levee District is a 1,891-acre district situated in St. Louis County, just five minutes west of Lambert-St. Louis International Airport and less than a mile west of the busiest major highway intersection in Missouri. Its strategic location is a major reason for the district's development success. The district is a political subdivision of Missouri.

Since 1972, business and economic growth in the St. Louis region have greatly benefited from the development of attractive and very functional industrial, office, and retail properties in the district. Location is one of the important keys to the district's development success.

At the end of 2005, the district contained 450 businesses, employing 22,800 with an annual payroll exceeding \$1 billion. The almost 240 properties in the district have over 18 million square feet of space with a market value of \$1.2 billion.

The district is protected from flooding by a 500-year levee and supporting flood control system managed around the clock by a qualified management firm and assisted by professional engineering firms. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (CORPS) conducts yearly inspections. The Federal Emergency Management Agency maps designate the district as being protected by a 500-year flood levee. As a result, the National Flood Insurance Program regulations do not require the purchase of flood insurance.

The district's flood control system is considered by many in the field to be one of the finest in the entire country. Supporting this claim is the fact that since 1972, four major floods have tested the district's flood control system – including the record 1993 flood – with minimal damage that was quickly repaired.

*(See Attachment A for responses to similar concerns of Dr. Robert E. Criss, of the Missouri Coalition of the Environment.)*

### **Major Flood Events**

Four major floods have occurred since the 2.6-mile, 500-year earthen levee was completed in September 1972. A flood is considered as major when the water level of the Missouri River is at a minimum of 10 feet above flood stage for at least one week.

During the following four major floods, the district's flood control system sustained minimal damage that was quickly repaired:

- Spring 1973 and fall of 1986: Crest elevations were under the 50-year flood level. The 1973 flood stage lasted about 75 days. This was significant as, at this time, the 500-year levee was only six months old. The 1986 flood was higher than the 1973 flood but of a relatively short duration.
- August 1993: During this record level flood, the Missouri River crested at 14.6 feet above flood stage on August 2, and remained above flood stage for about 110 days. It was estimated that at its August 2 crest, the Missouri River was at a 200-year flood level. The levee and the other components of the district's flood control system successfully resisted the flood.
- May 1995: The Missouri River crested at 11.7 feet above flood stage but the flood duration was relatively short.

In addition to the four major floods, the Missouri River has been over flood stage numerous times – usually at a level less than 5 feet over flood stage. These are normal events.

### **The Riverport Levee District**

The Earth City Levee District is immediately to the south of the Riverport Levee District. The Riverport Levee District project is located in the city of Maryland Heights, St. Louis County, Missouri, approximately 17 miles northwest of the city of St. Louis. This designed for

the 500-year Missouri River flood event, extends from about river mile 30.4 to river mile 29.6 above the Mississippi River on the right descending bank.

The project consists of a 1.7-mile long levee that protects the Riverport area and a portion of Interstate 70 from Missouri River floods. Riverport Business Park is a 525-acre, master-planned business and entertainment community that was carved out of the Missouri River floodplain through the construction of the Riverport Levee in 1980.

The Riverport Levee system is similar to the Earth City Levee District. It is made up of 1.5 miles of earthen levee, under seepage protection berms, a relief well system comprised of 76 wells, a three-stage pump station supplied by primary and generator backup power, and the associated stormwater retention channels within the development. Of the 1.5 miles of levee, only 0.4 mile is in direct contact with the Missouri River; the remainder is a flanking levee that runs between Riverport and the adjacent Howard Bend Levee District (to the south around Harrah's entertainment complex). Since the formation of the district, the system has been reviewed by the Corps on a yearly basis.

Unlike some levee systems that were modified farm levees, the Riverport Levee was designed and constructed by Sverdrup, a world-renowned civil engineering and construction company (subsequently acquired by Jacobs Engineering in 2000), to protect the Riverport Business Park. The Riverport Levee was designed and constructed to an elevation exceeding the 500-year flood elevation by 3 feet to protect the significant investment associated with a Class A business park.

## Levees

Recalling the Great Flood of 1993, the Missouri River rose to breach levees and flood all but a few spots along its reach in central and eastern Missouri—the primary exceptions being the Riverport and Earth City business parks in suburban St. Louis County. One of the most dramatic levee failures was the Monarch levee, which provided nominal 100-year flood protection for an area on the Missouri River called Chesterfield Valley, located in the city of Chesterfield in west St. Louis County.

The Chesterfield–Monarch Levee was considered by FEMA to be a 100-year levee, meaning that the valley it protected had roughly a 1 percent chance of flooding in any given year. By comparison, a community protected by a 500-year levee has about a 0.2 percent chance of flooding in a given year.

On July 30, an area of some 4,700 acres occupied by office and industrial parks, a large general aviation airport owned by St. Louis County government, and a 5 mile stretch of Interstate 64 disappeared under 10 feet of water. Because the levee break was in the upstream portion of the valley contained by the Monarch Levee, the floodwaters were very slow to drain out of that basin even as the level of the river dropped. Flood damage was estimated at more than \$320 million in 2006 dollars. Though no precise determination was possible because of limitations of historic records and continual changes in run-off characteristics throughout the river basins, the Corps estimated that the 1993 flood was of lower frequency than a 100-year flood but not nearly as extreme as a 500-year flood – perhaps a 250-year flood.

The recovery of Chesterfield Valley since 1993 is a dramatic and inspiring story. Nearly a half billion dollars in public and private funds have been invested, with nearly 20 percent of that directed toward providing improved access and a 500-year flood protection system – a levee rated to withstand a flood level with a probability of occurring once in 500 years, or 0.2 percent probability in any one year. Business is booming, and the city of Chesterfield, along with the private interests that took the risk and invested in the recovery, are reaping handsome fiscal and economic rewards.

Early speculation was that the failure of the Chesterfield-Monarch type levees relieved the pressures on the urban-type levees that did not fail. However, to ascertain the actual effect existing levees had on peak 1993 Mississippi and Missouri river flood stages, the Corps utilized their newly developed modeling program, UNET, which analyzed unsteady state river flow conditions. The analysis used flow data from 1993, 1986, and 1973 floods. The analysis suggested that if all levees (other than urban levees) were absent, the peak stage at St. Louis in 1993 would have been reduced by 2.5 feet, but still more than 17 feet above flood stage and almost 4 feet higher than the previously known maximum level recorded during the 1973 event.

### **Flood Water Dynamics**

Upland erosion and sedimentation in downstream areas are major causes of reduced water quality. Significant floodplain erosion and deposition occurred during the 1993 flood, principally on floodplain agricultural lands along the Missouri River. Preliminary analyses of aerial, satellite imagery, and historic Missouri River floodplain maps reveal that more than 90 percent of the areas affected by significant erosion and deposition are associated with breached levees situated in active, high-energy floodplain zones. Review of the history of levee failures in this area shows levees have been breached repeatedly at sites of natural river cutoffs or chutes in the past three decades.

Through the effects of soil erosion, any unprotected soil surface can be the source of suspended solids. Total suspended solids (TSS) may carry contaminants such as nutrients, organic matter, pesticides, and heavy metals. In most rivers TSS is primarily composed of small mineral particles. TSS is often referred to as “turbidity.” TSS, especially when the particles are small (less than 63 micrometers), carry many substances that are harmful or toxic.

The analysis of TSS loads provides useful information about the physical behavior of rivers. Because TSS concentration is partly a function of discharge, TSS loads increases as discharge increases. In many rivers, the amount of sediment (solids) transported (the load) can vary over three orders of magnitude during the year.

Comparison of the effects of the 1993 floods on the upper Mississippi and Missouri rivers shows that rivers in broadly similar physiographic regions may respond very differently to floods. The annual discharges of the upper Mississippi River are generally comparable to those of the Missouri River, but sediment yields of the Missouri average more than five times those of the Upper Mississippi. Average slope of the lower Missouri River floodplain (upstream of St. Louis) is about twice that of the middle Mississippi River floodplain (downstream from St.

Louis). Levee breaches along the lower Missouri commonly resulted in high-velocity flows across its relatively narrow and relatively steep (high gradient) floodplain.

Transport of sediment by fluid flow involves two fundamental steps: (1) erosion and entrainment of sediment, and (2) subsequent, sustained down-current or downstream movement of sediment. The term entrainment refers to the processes involved in lifting resting particles from the bed or otherwise putting them in motion. Once particles are lifted from the sediment into the overlying water, the rate at which they fall back to the bed (settling velocity) is an important factor in determining how far the particles travel downstream before they again come to rest or are deposited.

As previously noted, the average slope of the lower Missouri River floodplain (upstream of St. Louis) is twice that of the middle Mississippi River floodplain (downstream from St. Louis). As slope increases, the component of gravitational force parallel to the slope also increases. Thus, velocity is directly proportional to slope and increase as slope increases. Therefore, any suspended solids entrained in high-velocity flood waters in the Missouri River (above St. Louis) would stay in suspension until both slope and velocity decrease, which would most likely be when flood waters enter the lower Mississippi River floodplain (downstream of St. Louis).

## **Conclusion**

Based on my analysis of the data presented above, I submit the following conclusions:

1. The Flood of 1993 was the culmination of a series of unprecedented meteorological events creating a flood of previously unseen magnitude in extent, damage, and costs. The recurrence interval of the flood ranged from less than 100 years at many locations to near 500 years on segments of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers.
2. Services critical to human health were impacted by the flood waters. Hundreds of public drinking water suppliers lost their wells and their ability to supply their customers with clean safe drinking water. Many locations issued boil orders before consuming any water from affected water supplies. Hundreds of waste water facilities were inundated with flood waters, leading to service disruption or total shutdown, resulting in tens of thousands of gallons of raw, untreated sewage being discharged into already contaminated flood waters. The Safe Drinking Water Act requires public water systems to test the water for contaminants before allowing the public to resume consumption.
3. Fifty-nine Superfund sites (West Lake Landfill was not one of the 59) managed by EPA also experienced flooding; fortunately impacts were minimal. Flood damage at other unprotected locations proved more problematic, as the 18,000 orphaned drums containing unknown substances floated along with rising flood waters. Other businesses located in the floodplains and eventually inundated by the flood waters included gas stations, automotive garages, agricultural businesses, manufacturing companies, and solid waste disposal facilities. Each of these businesses used, manufactured, stored, or transported various forms of hazardous and nonhazardous pollutants near the river.

4. Areas that fared the best were protected by state-of-the-industry engineered 500-year flood levees/floodwalls, specifically, the Earth City Levee District and the Riverfront Levee District. Both of these districts have been designated by FEMA as 500-year levees providing a higher level of protection (about a 0.2 percent chance of flooding in a given year) than protection from a 100-year levee, meaning that the valley it protected had roughly a 1 percent chance of flooding in any given year. The 500-year levee protection does not go without its rewards as these Districts are home to businesses ranging from the Fortune 500 to small independent companies and employing thousands of local residents. All were protected from the 500-year flood with state-of-the-industry designed and constructed flood control systems.

5. Unrelated to the Earth City Levee District, but able to take advantage of the levee by coincidence of location is Operable Unit 1 (OU1) of the West Lake landfill. The toe of the most northern part of OU1 (see Attachment B) is approximately 1.5 miles from the bank of the Missouri River. Between the toe of OU1 and the river are the 500-year Earth City Levee and the Earth City flood-control retention pond. Both these components of the Earth City Levee District system provide the 500-year flood protection to the landfill as it does to the businesses located in the confines of the district proper.

The construction standard for a 500-year levee requires a minimum of three feet of freeboard above the 500-year flood level. For example, on the I-70 end of the 2.6-mile levee, the 500-year flood level is at an elevation of 459.03 feet, and the top of the levee is 462.03 feet. At the northern end of the levee, the 500-year level is 452.15 feet and the top of the levee is 459.34 feet. The flood waters of 1993 were significantly below the top of the levee.

However, there are other variables that could become a factor in controlling flood waters. As alluded to earlier, one of the successful methods of controlling the 1993 flood waters was the use of the reservoirs up stream. As stated, the federal flood-control reservoir system stored over 17 million acre feet of flood water. None of this water reached St. Louis until after the crest in August 1993. These reservoirs are credited with reducing flood levels at St. Louis by about 3 feet. Even if the reservoirs could only hold half the amount they did, the extra water downstream would still not have breached the 500-year levees.

6. If flood waters were to reach the toe of OU1, and if the toe were unprotected (e.g., no bank stabilization in place, no bank armoring in place), then what would predictably be low energy flood waters could begin to erode the bank and entrain landfill material into already contaminated and undrinkable flood water. However, the engineering of the cap at the West Lake Landfill will include armoring of some type to prevent possible erosion of the slope.

Attachment